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1.  Introduction  
Researchers around the world have attempted 
to explore how politics and corporate activities are 
related. Growing evidence has indicated that 
political uncertainty affects corporate financial 
policy and one of these policies is dividend payout 
(Farooq & Ahmed, 2019; Huang, Wu, & Yu, 2015; 
Tran, 2020). Dividend payout is critically 
important to the stakeholders of firms. This is not 
surprising as dividend policy appears to be at the 
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Previous evidence has shown that numerous factors influence dividend policy, but 
how political uncertainty affects a firm’s cash dividend policy remains blurry. This 
study examines the relationship between cash dividends and political uncertainty in 
Nigeria. More so, the study analyses whether this relationship prevails on matured 
and non-matured firms. The study employed ordinary least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) approach with robust standard error on a data set of non-financial listed 
Nigerian firms. The results revealed that political uncertainty strongly influences 
firm’s cash dividend, and a matured firm tends to pay greater dividends than non-
matured firms (firms with more growth options). Thus, this finding suggests that 
matured firms pay more dividends during period of political uncertainty. 
Consequently, the study supported the agency theory and the life cycle theory.  
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top of the most debated field in finance (Baker & 
Weigand, 2015). This study analyses the political 
influence on a firm’s dividend policy in Nigeria as 
well as how this relationship prevails in matured 
firms.  
A presidential or general election in a country 
could also provide an insight into the dividend 
puzzle. This is because every political party has its 
unique way of dealing with economic issues 
through the issuance of a new policy. For instance, 
in the developing world, the assumption is that a 
conservative party politician serving as a president 
may be stricter on foreign importation policies 
compared with a member of a liberal party. So, if 
a firm depends on sourcing its raw materials from 
another nation, then this may affect its operations 
as it exposes the firm to uncertainty and, hence, 
impacts its profitability, which will, in turn, have 
an influence on its dividend policy. Brav, Graham, 
Harvey and Michaely (2005) asserted that a 
prevailing economic setting tends to influence a 
firm’s dividend policy. Uncertainty may prevail, 
particularly when a new president is expected to 
be elected. Buchanan, Cao, Liljeblom and 
Weihrich (2017) indicated that policy shocks such 
as economic and regulatory reforms might affect a 
firm on the one hand and the benefits of 
shareholders on the other hand. Hence, this 
political uncertainty leads a firm to reconsider its 
financial policies, such as a dividend policy as a 
precautionary measure. 
Prior works have indicated the significant 
effect of uncertainty on cash dividends, from the 
United States (Buchanan et al., 2017; Farooq & 
Ahmed, 2019) and other countries (Huang et al., 
2015). However, evidence on how political 
uncertainty impacts dividend policy from a 
developing economy, for instance, Nigeria 
remains scanty. For example, Farooq and Ahmed 
(2019) reported that firms pay more dividends 
during the years of a US presidential election. 
First, unlike the United States, Nigeria has 
experienced political instability. Therefore, the 
result obtained in the US market may not apply to 
the Nigerian context because of differences in 
their environmental settings and regulatory 
frameworks. Second, since the inception of the 
fourth republic in 1999, only one party was in 
power from 1999 to the first quarter of 2015, and 
this party was considered liberal. Third, it was a 
coalition or alliance of a group of parties that 
ousted the long-term ruling party. Therefore, a 
period of high uncertainty as to economic and 
regulatory reforms came into being, which could 
affect the listed firms.  
Fourth, other studies, for example, Huang et 
al. (2015), have considered international crises as 
a source of political uncertainty, this may not 
provide a clear understating of the phenomenon in 
view since political crises varies from country to 
country. For instance, the political crises in UK 
may not be the same for US let alone the political 
crises of an advanced country with that of 
developing country. Lastly, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no single study that have tested 
the relationship between political uncertainty and 
dividend policy on matured firms. 
Hence, this paper contributes to the dividend 
policy literature in a newly democratised system 
of government compared to the United States and 
other countries of the developed world that 
political uncertainty has greater influence on 
dividend policy. Second, the current study also 
found, consistent with the life cycle theory, that 
matured firms pay more dividends as compared 
with growing firms. The result indicates that a 
mature firm may not be influenced by the shock 
that arises as a result of a national election. 
Therefore, shareholders of a matured firm are 
assured of an inflow of returns in the form of 
dividends. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section two discusses the relevant literature and 
hypothesis development. The methodology is 
situated and discussed in section three, while 
section four discusses the findings. The last 
section concludes the study. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses 
development 
Prior studies have attempted to link the 
dividend policy puzzle to various theories. One of 
them is agency theory. This theory predicts that a 
conflict of interest exists between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Often, 
shareholders who happen to be outside investors 
tend to receive fewer benefits from the capital that 
they have invested in a firm because the managers 
prefer to maintain the cash or use it for perquisite 
consumption (Cao, Du, & Ørding, 2017). In this 
instance, a dividend payment remedies the agency 
conflict associated with squandering the available 
free cash flow in a firm (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986). It is also argued by Choy, Gul, and 
Yao (2011) that agency problems were severe in 
poorer shareholder protection and proportional-
electoral countries because minority shareholders 
are unable to exercise their rights, let alone to 
address agency-related problems. 
 
Political uncertainty and dividend policy 
Political forces are part of the forces that 
either strengthen or weaken the economic 
activities of countries. For instance, Farooq and 
Ahmed (2019) affirmed that politics significantly 
affected corporate managerial decisions in the 
United States. Moreover, the operating 
environment of a firm is often altered as a result of 
national elections, thereby leading to uncertainty, 
which, in turn, affects future policy (Baloria & 
Mamo, 2017). Similarly, Chay and Suh, 2009 and 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) have provided 
evidence that uncertainty at the firm level impacts 
its payout policy. This finding implies that 
examining how uncertainty relates to cash 
dividend decision will be an interesting issue. 
Using a data sample from the United States 
between 1996 and 2016, Farooq and Ahmed 
(2019) documented a positive and statistically 
significant relation between dividend payout and 
political uncertainty proxied by a presidential 
election. The results indicated that firms pay a 
higher dividend during a presidential election year 
as compared to a non-election period. Therefore, 
attesting that the firms can withstand the shocks 
that may prevail as a consequent of economic 
policy changes. Huang et al. (2015), while 
studying 35 countries, revealed that firms retained 
more cash during political uncertainty to provide a 
cushion or preventive measures against future 
political shocks thus, corroborating the evidence 
of Buchanan et al. (2017) that firms in the United 
States were less likely to initiate dividends during 
a period of policy uncertainty. 
On the other hand, firms are likely to initiate 
a dividend or increase their existing dividends in 
expectation of a policy change such as tax 
increase. The increase or decrease in tax 
expectations is a mechanism through which firms 
respond in advance of the real changes in taxes 
(Farooq & Ahmed, 2019). Buchanan et al. (2017) 
found that firms in the United States reacted 
differently regarding their regular and special 
dividend payout policy with respect to 2010 and 
2012 tax policies.  
Awotundun (2018) also confirmed these 
findings by documenting a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the 
political factor and dividend payout while 
investigating the listed commercial banks in 
Nigeria between 2004 and 2014. More recently, 
Tran (2020) used data from US and showed that 
banks decreased their dividend payout as a result 
of high uncertainty. These findings negated the 
evidence documented from US market (Farooq & 
Ahmed, 2019). Summarily, National election 
could serve as a pipeline through which economic 
outcomes are influenced. Consistent with the 
agency theory that shareholders may demand a 
dividend because of uncertainty in the managerial 
behaviour that may lead to perquisite 
consumption. Hence, we posited that: 
H1: Political uncertainty is positively associated 
with cash dividend payout. 
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Prior literature has suggested the importance 
of retained earnings in dividend payout policy. 
This variable (retained earnings) is widely used as 
a proxy for firm maturity. For instance, DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2006)  augured that 
dividends are paid by matured (retained earnings 
as a proxy of firm maturity) and established firms. 
Conceivably reflecting the financial life cycle of 
firms,  matured firms tend to pay dividends as they 
have higher profitability and are less attractive for 
new investment opportunities. Implicitly, paying 
out dividend could be a means of addressing an 
agency problem as these firms may have cash in 
abundance, and if not distributed to the 
shareholders, these will result in an adverse 
agency conflict (Jensen, 1986).  
Therefore, retained earnings may provide a 
clue as to whether during uncertainty period firms 
may disgorge more cash as dividends to the 
owners or otherwise. Farooq and Ahmed (2019) 
reported that larger firms pay a higher dividend 
during periods of uncertainty. This is so because 
the size of a firm is one of the characteristics of 
dividend-paying firms see, for example, (Adamu, 
Ishak, & Hassan, 2019; DeAngelo et al., 2006; 
Fama & French, 2001; Hoberg & Prabhala, 2009; 
Jiraporn, Kim, & Kim, 2011). This study argues 
that firms with more retained earnings at their 
disposal may pay more dividends than growing 
firms. DeAngelo et al. (2006) showed that a 
significant number of firms with more retained 
earnings pay a dividend in the US market. 
Both Coulton and Ruddock (2011), and 
Yarram and Dollery (2015) using data from the 
Australian market also supported the lifecycle 
theory that dividend payers are firms with fewer 
growth options at their disposal. More so, Denis 
and Osobov (2008) revealed that among the top 
features of dividend-paying firms was retained 
earnings in countries like Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The study found that dividend 
payers in these countries were large firms, with 
more amounts of retained earnings. Recently, 
Adamu et al. (2019) from the Nigerian market 
concurred with the prior evidence that the decision 
to pay a dividend is greater in mature firms. Thus, 
suggesting that matured firms have higher 
accumulated cash and used it in paying cash 
dividend. 
Therefore, since maturity is among the 
features of dividend-paying firms, it is expected 
that matured firms will continue to disgorge cash 
in the form of dividend even during uncertainty 
periods such as during presidential election. It 
depends on the availability of cash at their disposal 
and to maintain their reputation by paying a 
dividend. Based on the life cycle theory and prior 
literature, the following hypothesis can be stated 
as:     
H2: The influence of political uncertainty on 
dividend policy in matured firms is greater than in 
non-matured firms 
 
3. Research method 
This study uses secondary data to analyze the 
listed firms of the Nigerian stock exchange market 
(NSE) between 2011 and 2015. This crucial period 
marks the final year of the ruling party since the 
inception of the fourth republic. It is also the start 
of the new political party that emerged from an 
alliance of parties. The sample covers non-
financial firms listed on the main floor of the NSE. 
Financial firms were not included as their 
operations are governed by different regulation 
than other sectors, and they have different 
requirements in terms of dividend payout policy. 
Additionally, prior studies (Al-Najjar & 
Kilincarslan, 2016; Farooq & Ahmed, 2019; 
Huang et al., 2015) have excluded financial firms 
in their final sample. 
The availability of information related to 
corporate governance and ownership needed for 
the analysis led to the selection of 89 firms and, 
hence, 445 firm-year observations from 2011-
2015. Of the 445 firm-year observations, 250 
observations paid a dividend during the period of 
the study, while 195 did not pay a dividend. The 
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period of the study (2011-2015) was selected 
because of the downward trend of dividend 
payment in the NSE market. Abdulkadir (2015) 
who posited that among the major challenges 
confronting the NSE market relates to the issue of 
non-payment phenomenon.  An investigation into 
the history of firms paying dividend indicated that 
only 18 listed firms consistently paid dividends to 
their shareholders between September 2011 and 
September 2016 (Awoyemi & Bagga, 2016). From 
a survey, Nwidobie (2011) reported that dividend 
payment by listed firms in Nigeria is falling below 
the expectation of investor in the NSE market. 
Therefore, these samples were used 
simultaneously throughout the estimations of the 
paper. The firm-specific characteristics used for 
this study were extracted from the Datastream 
database, while corporate governance and 
ownership variables were obtained from the 
annual reports of the firms under review. Last, 
information about the presidential election years 
was retrieved from Independent National electoral 
commission official website (INEC). Following 
AL-Dhamari, Ku Ismail, and Al-Gamrh (2016), 
Farooq and Ahmed (2019), and Huang et al. 
(2015), the model in the current study was 
estimated using ordinary least squares dummy 
variable fixed effects with robust standard error to 
account to control heteroskedasticity issues. 
 
Variable measurement 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable for this study was 
dividend yield (DIY), which was measured as the 
ratio of dividend per share to the price per share 
for a firm (AL-Dhamari et al., 2016; Al-Najjar & 
Kilincarslan, 2016; Farooq & Ahmed, 2019). 
 
Independent variable 
The independent variable of interest in this 
study was political uncertainty proxied by 
presidential elections. Following Farooq and 
Ahmed (2019), the variable took the value of “1”  
for years in which presidential elections were held 
and “0” if otherwise. Baloria and Mamo (2017) 
argued that elections should be treated as an event 
that can change the existing environment in which 
firms operate and after that, provide an avenue for 
the rise of uncertainty on the outcome of future 
policy (Farooq & Ahmed, 2019). 
Presidential elections in Nigeria are 
conducted after every four years, and this study 
covers only presidential elections 2011 and 2015. 
Retained earnings (RET) was used as a proxy for 
firm maturity.  Following Francis, Hasan, John 
and Song (2011) retained earnings scaled by total 
capital. Prior evidence has shown that retained 
earnings are among the main features of a 
dividend-paying firm (for example, DeAngelo et 
al., 2006; Francis et al., 2011; Jiraporn et al., 
2011).  
 
Control variables 
Consistent with the literature on dividend 
policy, this study used control variables that 
included return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for 
profitability, firm leverage (LEV) for 
indebtedness, sales growth (SGW) for firm 
growth, block-holders ownership (BLK) to control 
for ownership structures and as an indication of 
whether a firm was closely held or otherwise and 
total assets, (FZE) to capture the effect size of the 
firm and whether was is a large or small firm, and 
board size (BSZ) to control for corporate 
governance (Adamu et al., 2019; Al-Najjar & 
Kilincarslan, 2016; Farooq & Ahmed, 2019; 
Francis et al., 2011). ROA was measured as net 
income to total assets; LEV represented the total 
debt divided by total assets (Farooq & Ahmed, 
2019; Francis et al., 2011). SGW was measured by 
current sales less previous sales divided by 
previous sales (DeAngelo et al., 2006).  
BLK was the fraction of shares owned by 
owners of at least 5% shares of the firm scaled by 
total shares in issue (Huang et al., 2015). FZE was 
the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for 
firm size (Farooq & Ahmed, 2019). Finally, BSZ 
was measured as the logarithm of the number of 
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directors on board (AL-Dhamari et al., 2016). The 
model of the study is presented below: 
 
DIYit= β0 + β1POLit+  β2RETit + β3ROAit + β4LEVit  + β5SGWit + β6BLKit + β7FZEit  
            + β8BSZit + eit…………............................................................................................(1).  
 
4. Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the study. On the average, the 
dividend yield was 2.6%, which was higher than 
1.9% as previously reported (Al-Najjar & 
Kilincarslan (2016) from Turkish firms and is less 
than 3.68% as documented by Awotundun (2018) 
while analysing the banking sector in Nigeria. The 
values imply that the shareholders of the sampled 
firms earned N2.60 relative to the market price of 
the shares of the firms. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for continuous variable 
Variables Obs. Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
 DIY 250 0.026 0.002 0.138 0.034 
RET 250 0.100 -0.669 0.546 0.304 
ROA 250 0.066 -0.113 0.253 0.085 
LEV 250 0.248 0.003 1.620 0.408 
SGW 250 0.044 -0.860 1.696 0.240 
FZE 250 7.002 4.836 8.993 0.793 
BSZ 250 2.122 1.609 2.708 0.250 
Notes:: DIY=Dividend yield; RET= Retained earnings; ROA= Return on assets; LEV= Leverage; SGW= sales 
growth; BLK=Block holders ownership; BSZ= Board Size. 
 
Table 2 indicates the descriptive statistics for 
the three dummy variables (POL, RET and BLK) 
used in the study.  Frequencies and percentages are 
used for interpreting the dummy variables. A total 
of 104 firm year-observations, (41.60% of the 
sample firms) represent the presidential elections of 
Nigeria, while 146 (58.40% of the sample firms) 
were period of non-presidential elections. A total of 
119 firm year-observations (representing 47.60% 
of the sample firms) were having retained earnings 
higher than the within-sample median whereas 131 
firm year-observations of the study (52.40% of the 
sample firms) were having lower than the within-
sample median value. Thus, indicating that the 
number of matured firms fall below the number of 
growing firms in this study. Lastly, a total of 127 
firm year-observations (50.80% of the sample 
firms) have block holders greater than the within-
sample median whilst 123 observations of the 
sample firms (49.20% of the sampled firms) have 
less than the within-sample median. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for dummy variables 
  Frequencies Percentage  
 Obs. 0 1 0 1 Total (%) 
POL 250 146 104 58.40 41.60 100 
RET 250 131 119 52.40 47.60 100 
BLK 250 123 127 49.20 50.80 100 
145 
Adamu, Bala & Suleiman/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(2), 2020, pp 139-150 
 
 
 
Note: POL=Political uncertainty; RET=Retained earnings is a dummy variable 1 if a firm’s retained earnings 
are greater than the median sample, otherwise 0. BLK=Block holders ownership is a dummy variable 1 if the 
stake of the block holders is greater than the median sample, otherwise 0.  
 
The Variance-Inflation-Factor (VIF) was also 
estimated, and the result is presented in Table 3. 
The results show that none of the variables was 
above the threshold of 10. The highest VIF in this 
study was retained earnings (RET of 1.54), which 
is below the upper boundary of 10. Hence, no 
evidence exists of a multicollinearity problem 
(Gujarati, 2004). Furthermore, the correlation 
matrix result is documented in Table 3. The 
correlation matrix between the pairs was relatively 
low and less than 0.6. None of the correlation 
coefficients was greater than 0.6, which may call 
for multicollinearity concerns. Therefore, the 
model does not suffer from multicollinearity issues. 
The variables of interest in this correlation matrix 
were political uncertainty (POL) and Retained 
earnings (RET). As can be seen, DIY was 
positively related to POL (r=0.158) and RET 
(r=0.383). The sign of the correlation coefficient of 
the matrix may suggest the probable direction of the 
relationship between the dependent and 
independent variable in the main regression 
equation. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
VAR VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(1) DIY 1.300 1.000         
(2) POL 1.040 0.158* 1.000        
(3) RET 1.540 0.383*** 0.045 1.000       
(4) ROA 1.390 0.355*** 0.014 0.491*** 1.000      
(5) LEV 1.200 0.007 -0.022 -0.199** -0.139* 1.000     
(6) SGW 1.030 -0.046 -0.050 -0.032 -0.033 0.013 1.000    
(7) BLK 1.100 0.154* -0.030 0.179** 0.104 -0.128* 0.128* 1.000   
(8) FZE 1.410 0.104 0.051 0.339*** 0.216*** -0.379*** 0.088 0.221*** 1.000  
(9) BSZ 1.080 0.090 -0.053 0.081 0.051 -0.004 0.028 0.047 0.235*** 1.000 
Notes:: DIY=Dividend yield; POL=Political uncertainty; RET= Retained earnings; ROA= Return on assets; LEV= 
Leverage; SGW= sales growth; BLK=Block holders ownership; FZE= Firm size; BSZ= Board Size. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 4 shows the total dividend per share paid 
during the presidential election and non-
presidential election years in Naira. As can be seen, 
the amount paid (N64.94) in the election year, for 
instance, 2011 which was a year of a national 
election in Nigeria, was higher than the amount 
paid in non-election (2012: N58.045 and 2014: 
N57.685) year except for 2013. The second 
presidential election captured in this study was 
2015. When the amount of dividend paid in this 
year is compared with other non-election years, the 
amount paid (N81.03) was much higher than in 
other non-election years. Thus, this may also 
provide a clue to the fact that uncertainty 
surrounding the election period may impact the 
dividend paid by a firm particularly because the 
ruling party was forecast be the loser in the 2015 
presidential election.  
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Table 4. Dividend paid per share in presidential election and non-election years 
Dividend paid in Naira 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Presidential election year  N64.94 - - - N81.03 
Non-Presidential election year - N58.045 N69.6334 N57.685 - 
Regression analysis 
Table 5 shows the result regarding the 
prediction on the relationship between dividend 
policy, political uncertainty and how this 
relationship prevails in matured firms. The 
estimations were based on ordinary least squares 
with robust standard errors to control the effect of 
heteroskedasticity related issues. 
 
Table 5. The regression results 
VAR. Sign Panel A Panel B: Payers only Panel C: All firms 
  Payers only  All firms HIGH RET LOW RET  HIGH RET LOW RET  
POL + 0.0104*** 0.00613* 0.0175*** 0.00460 0.00912* 0.00511 
  (0.00397) (0.00329) (0.00590) (0.00452) (0.00484) (0.00413) 
RET + 0.0316*** 0.0263*** - - - - 
  (0.00708) (0.00498) - - - - 
ROA + 0.0874*** 0.0778*** 0.0955** 0.0587** 0.114*** 0.0584*** 
  (0.0263) (0.0207) (0.0399) (0.0267) (0.0309) (0.0219) 
LEV - 0.00371 -0.00308 -0.00718 0.0181 -0.0141* 0.0119 
  (0.00718) (0.00567) (0.00995) (0.0110) (0.00778) (0.00865) 
SGW -/+ -0.00286 -0.00793** -0.00161 -0.0107 -0.0194** -0.00371 
  (0.00828) (0.00396) (0.0104) (0.0127) (0.00808) (0.00236) 
BLK -/+ 0.00686* 0.00711* 0.00861 0.0100** 0.00865 0.00732 
  (0.00409) (0.00368) (0.00724) (0.00479) (0.00626) (0.00475) 
FZE + -0.00572 -0.00640** -0.0162*** 0.0121*** -0.0141*** 0.00868** 
  (0.00352) (0.00263) (0.00494) (0.00394) (0.00363) (0.00355) 
BSZ + 0.0206** 0.0198*** 0.0151 0.0132 0.00711 0.0193** 
  (0.00855) (0.00697) (0.0168) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.00919) 
Industry  Controlled  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Constant  0.00878 0.0230 0.107*** -0.111*** 0.113*** -0.0907*** 
  (0.0290) (0.0217) (0.0372) (0.0354) (0.0289) (0.0304) 
F-stat  7.85*** 12.50*** 3.43*** 1.90** 4.93*** 3.73*** 
R2   0.265 0.196 0.244 0.218 0.187 0.152 
OBSERV.  250 445 119 131 222 223 
Notes: DIY=Dividend yield; POL=Political uncertainty; RET= Retained earnings; ROA= Return on assets; LEV= 
Leverage; SGW= sales growth; BLK=Block holders ownership; FZE= Firm size; BSZ= Board Size. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
From Table 5 Panel A, column 1 is the result 
of only dividend payers during the study period 
while column 2 in Panel A is the result of both 
payers and non-dividend payers. The variable of 
interest in this current study was political 
uncertainty. Consistent with the hypothesis, the 
result shows that political uncertainty was positive 
and statistically significant in Panel A column 1 and 
2. The positive and significant coefficient suggests 
that relative to non-election year (national election), 
firms pay more dividends to their shareholders 
This finding has several possible explanations. 
First, the result could imply that shareholders 
demand more cash dividends from firms during 
high uncertainty associated with the presidential 
election, hence, agreeing with the agency theory. 
Alternatively, the result could be that firms use a 
cash dividend payout to enhance the confidence of 
the investors’ perceptions that uncertainty 
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emanating from policy shocks may not hinder a 
firm from paying a cash dividend 
The result in this current study agrees  with the 
findings of recent study (Farooq & Ahmed, 
2019)that firms pay a higher ratio of their profits as 
dividends during the year of the national election. 
This study also concurs with the prior evidence 
(Buchanan et al., 2017; Choy et al., 2011) who 
found evidence on the increase of dividend during 
uncertainty in a tax environment. The literature also 
revealed that firms in a majoritarian system tend to 
pay more dividends than firms in a proportional 
system of election respectively. However, the 
results failed to agree with Awotundun (2018), who 
reported an inverse association between dividend 
policy and political factors among listed Nigerian 
banks.  
For the second hypothesis, firms were divided 
into two categories based on retained earnings. 
These categories were high and corded as “1” if the 
retained earnings of a firm were higher than the 
sample median and low coded as “0” if otherwise. 
The regression result is also presented in Table 5, 
Panel B and C column 3-6. The result indicates that 
political uncertainty in high retained earnings firms 
was positive and statistically significant in Panel B 
column 4 and Panel C column 5. Hence, this was 
consistent with hypothesis 2 that matured firms pay 
more dividends than growing firms; therefore, the 
results confirm the life cycle theory of dividend 
policy.  
The result, therefore, concurs with the prior 
evidence that matured firms have more tendency in 
paying a dividend as compared with firms with 
more growth option (Al-Najjar & Kilincarslan, 
2016; Coulton & Ruddock, 2011; DeAngelo et al., 
2006; Hoberg & Prabhala, 2009; Huang et al., 
2015; Yarram & Dollery, 2015). However, it does 
not support earlier evidence (Abdulkadir, Abdullah, 
& Woei-Chyuan, 2015)  that showed  firms with 
more retained earnings are less likely to pay a 
dividend.  The results of the current study also 
suggest that political uncertainty may not hinder 
matured firms from paying a cash dividend to their 
shareholders. They do so possibly to assure the 
existing investors or to attract potential investors 
because politics may not affect their dividend 
policy irrespective of the political party that is in 
power. 
 
Table 6. Regression results for sensitivity analysis using logit regression 
Vars. Sign Panel A Panel B: Payers only Panel C: All firms 
  Payers only Al firms High Ret Low Ret  High Ret Low Ret  
POL + 0.924*** 0.408* 1.352*** 0.844* 0.427 0.00511 
  (0.325) (0.237) (0.523) (0.482) (0.342) (0.00413) 
RET + 3.356*** 3.231*** - - - - 
  (0.675) (0.531) - - - - 
ROA + 5.267** 5.672*** 6.657* 4.983 6.620*** 0.0584*** 
  (2.303) (1.626) (3.619) (3.464) (2.341) (0.0219) 
LEV - 0.0483 -0.225 -0.480 0.694 -0.479 0.0119 
  (0.398) (0.322) (0.530) (0.957) (0.388) (0.00865) 
SGW -/+ 0.492 -0.427 1.089 -1.322 -0.497 -0.00371 
  (0.647) (0.435) (0.926) (1.256) (0.575) (0.00236) 
BLK -/+ 0.466 0.490* 0.543 0.415 0.460 0.00732 
  (0.347) (0.261) (0.603) (0.482) (0.391) (0.00475) 
FZE + -0.215 0.0149 -0.941** 0.973*** -0.244 0.00868** 
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  (0.268) (0.200) (0.380) (0.367) (0.282) (0.00355) 
BSZ + 2.285*** 1.866*** 2.095 1.745 1.336* 0.0193** 
  (0.766) (0.525) (1.322) (1.195) (0.791) (0.00919) 
Industry  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Constant  -4.745** -5.013*** 1.946 -12.64*** -1.011 -0.0907*** 
  (2.056) (1.533) (2.841) (3.411) (2.080) (0.0304) 
Wald Chi2  64.65*** 96.48*** 18.05* 24.40* 27.07* 36.84* 
Pseudo R2  0.266 0.272 0.147 0.175 0.112 0.173 
GOF (10): Chi2  8.41 7.89 12.58 5.91 10.7 4.36 
Prob.  0.3945 0.444 0.127 0.657 0.219 0.824 
Observations  250 445 119 131 222 223 
Notes: DIY=Dividend yield; POL=Political uncertainty; RET= Retained earnings; ROA= Return on assets; LEV= 
Leverage; SGW= sales growth; BLK=Block holders ownership; FZE= Firm size; BSZ= Board Size. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Robustness tests 
Logistic regression was used to check for the 
robustness of the results. The firms were 
categorised based on their retained earnings.  If the 
retained earnings were more than the median of the 
sample, then a firm was assigned a “1,” 
representing a high dividend yield firm. If the 
retained earnings fell below the median score, then 
a firm was assigned “0,” representing a low 
dividend yield firm. The results are reported in 
Table 6 Panel A to C. 
 The results show that the coefficient of the 
variable of interest POL was positively and 
statistically significant in columns 1 to 6, as 
reported in Table 5. However, POL in Panel C 
column 5 to 6 was positive but not significant. 
Consequently, the results suggest that the findings 
were not sensitive to the alteration of the dependent 
variable, as well as the estimation method.   
 
5. Conclusions  
The paper tested the association between 
dividend policy and political uncertainty, it also 
explored how this relationship influence matured 
and non-matured firms in Nigeria.  Empirically the 
analysis indicated that political uncertainty 
significantly affected dividend policy, the effect is 
more pronounced in matured than non-matured 
firms. Accordingly, the findings provide support to 
prior evidence on political uncertainty and dividend 
policy and are consistent with agency theory and 
life cycle theory. 
The findings of the current study may be useful 
to both existing and potential investors, particularly 
for those that favour a cash dividend against a 
capital gain in the NSE market. Also, mature firms 
are worth investing in because the national election 
in Nigeria did not affect these categories of firms.  
The study may also be of benefit to regulatory 
bodies such as the NSE and Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Nigeria because the 
results show, that besides the traditional 
determinant of dividends such as corporate 
governance variables and firm-specific features, a 
national election is also an essential driver of a 
dividend that should be given more attention when 
designing policy concerning dividend pay-outs for 
listed firms in the country 
Lastly, future research may extend this study 
by capturing more years and dwelling more on the 
features of growth option firms. Also, other 
researchers may incorporate more countries from 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
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